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OVERVIEW — This paper lays the groundwork for understanding the impli-
cations of the historic U.S. Supreme Court decision in the case of Olmstead
v. L.C., which has far-reaching consequences for the long-term care of people
with disabilities. The paper reviews the critical components influencing the
case: the Medicaid program’s role in funding community-based long-term
care; the Americans with Disabilities Act, which serves as the statutory basis
for the decision; and the Court’s legal reasoning. Also, the paper describes the
federal and state responses to the ruling and concludes with a brief discussion
of some legal issues that will be debated in the courts.
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Is Community Care a Civil Right?
The Unfolding Saga of
the Olmstead Decision
On June 19, 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a landmark
civil rights decision that caused people with disabilities to cheer. The
ruling, Olmstead v. L.C., put states on notice that unnecessary segrega-
tion of individuals with disabilities is a violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). People with disabilities hailed the ruling
as their civil rights equivalent to Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,
which ordered the desegregation of the nation’s public schools.1 A new
era promising home- and community-based services as the standard for
long-term care was on the horizon.
The ruling elicited powerful responses from many organizations and
people. The federal government issued new guidance for states to comply
with the ADA and provided grants to expand the availability of
community-based services. Dozens of states organized task forces to
develop implementation plans. Researchers published numerous legal
analyses. And advocates filed lawsuits against states.
Although the case that set off this flurry of activity appears straight-
forward, the decision it produced has resulted in years of uncertainty.
The Court’s opinion is complex, its guidance to states is vague, and the
unanswered legal questions are many. Writing for the majority, Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg foreshadowed the uncertainties the opinion would
leave behind when she wrote: “We confront the question whether the
proscription of discrimination may require placement of persons with
mental disabilities in community settings, rather than in institutions.
The answer, we hold, is a qualified yes.” Resolving the ambiguities raised
by this ruling will take many more years. In the meantime, states have
no choice but to proceed with their efforts to comply.
MEDICAID’S INSTITUTIONAL BIAS:
A HINDRANCE TO THE AVAILABILITY OF
HOME- AND COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES
The Olmstead case is not based on Medicaid law, nor does it expressly
require a restructuring of the program.2 However, the Olmstead plaintiffs
sought placement under a Medicaid home- and community-based services
waiver, and state compliance with the ADA will likely be financed largely
by Medicaid. Consequently, the first step in understanding the Olmstead
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ruling is a brief review of Medicaid’s evolving role in financing home-
and community-based care.
Medicaid is the nation’s primary payer of long-term care services, paying
44 percent of such costs in 2000.3 Twenty-seven percent of that amount
pays for services delivered in home- and community-based settings.
This represents a four-fold increase in such Medicaid expenditures since
1990. Despite this growth, however, there remains substantial unmet
demand, and waiting lists for services are common.4
One of the major barriers to enhancing the supply of home and
community-based care has been the institutional bias of Medicaid, that
is, its historic inclination to cover long-term care services more readily
when the beneficiary resides in an institution, such as a nursing home,
than when he or she lives at home. When Medicaid was created in the
1960s, the home health care industry was not very developed, and
Medicaid’s service coverage for long-term care was focused on nursing
homes. The only mandatory coverage of long-term care services was
for skilled nursing facility care for people age 21 and older, although
states had the option of providing some home health services, private-
duty services, and rehabilitation services.5
There were a few additions to home-based services during the 1970s,
such as mandatory coverage of home health services for those entitled
to skilled nursing facility services. However, a broad range of home-
and community-based services were not added. Policymakers feared
runaway costs would result from induced demand, also referred to as
the “woodwork effect.”6 Consequently, the vast majority of Medicaid
long-term care spending continued to be for nursing home care.7
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a series of demonstrations were conducted
to measure whether providing community-based services to a Medicaid
beneficiary was less expensive than institutional care.8 These studies helped
generate policymaker interest in using home- and community-based services
as a substitute for nursing home care, even before many of these
demonstrations were evaluated. In 1981, Congress amended Section 1915
of the Social Security Act, authorizing states, subject to federal approval, to
cover home- and community-based services under a waiver program.
Under the Section 1915(c) waiver authority, states could provide home-
and community-based services to specific Medicaid populations such as
the aged disabled and people with mental retardation or developmental
disabilities. The law listed several types of services allowed under a
waiver (for example, homemaker, home health aide, and adult day health)
but also permitted other services, as long as they were cost-effective
and necessary to avoid institutionalization.9
The growth of Medicaid home- and community-based care, however,
was restrained by waiver policies and procedures to protect against the
woodwork effect. First, the population eligible for a waiver was restricted
One of the major bar-
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by requiring that the person not only needed the care but also, after an
assessment, was determined to be at risk for placement in an institution.
Second, the maximum number of people that could be placed in a waiver
was capped based on a formula (frequently referred to as the “cold bed
rule”) that measured bed vacancies in nursing homes. Third, in response
to great concern over costs at the federal level, especially within the
Office of Management and Budget, the size of the waiver programs and
the pace of approvals were restrained.10
The major breakthrough came in 1993 when President Clinton announced
to the nation’s governors that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS, then named the Health Care Financing Administration)
would provide greater waiver flexibility for states. The next year CMS
eliminated the cold bed rule. In its place, CMS substituted a more flexible
cost-neutrality requirement, under which states had to demonstrate that
aggregate expenditures with the waiver program would not exceed the
cost of serving an equivalent group of people in an institution.
The result was a dramatic increase in state spending for home- and
community-based services. In 1990, Medicaid spent $3.9 billion on home
and community-based care, representing 13 percent of total Medicaid
long-term care spending. By 2000, the amount had increased more than
four-fold, to $18.2 billion, or 27 percent of total Medicaid spending for
long-term care.11 In 1999, 49 states had 212 waivers serving a total of
688,152 people.12
Despite these improvements, a number of factors still discourage the
growth in Medicaid home- and community-based care. One is a payment
policy that does not cover housing or meal costs in the home-based
setting, although Medicaid does factor these costs into payments to
nursing homes. This distinction furthers the contention that an
institutional bias against home- and community-based care still exists.
Another factor is states’ concern over their budget outlays. With Medicaid
second only to education as the largest state expenditure, states have
moved to control home- and community-based service costs by restricting
(by age and conditions) the populations eligible for the services, the
number of slots for each waiver, the service cost per person, and the
covered services. In addition, states may be cautious in filling all
approved slots, preferring to wait until they are confident that sufficient
monies are available for the state match.
The cumulative effect of these factors has been numerous waiting lists
for waiver programs. For example, one report noted that in the mid-
1990s New Hampshire had a waiting list of 325 people; New Mexico,
2,400; Massachusetts, 2,437; Florida, 6,000; and Texas, 17,500.13 The lists
can be so long that some people wait years before receiving services.14
This shortage of a full array of readily available home- and community-
based services created the environment for the Olmstead decision.
In 1999, 49 states had
212 waivers serving a
total of 688,152 people.
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THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
The second critical component in the Olmstead ruling is the Americans
with Disabilities Act. A civil rights law administered by the Department
of Justice, the ADA was enacted “to provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities.”15 Fifty-four million people are protected by the act,16
which defines a disability as a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities.17 (See text
box for examples of disabilities protected by the ADA.)
The primary goals of the law are to assure that people with disabilities
enjoy the greatest degree of independence possible and to assist in their
full participation in the economy and their community. The law provides
them legal recourse when they have been subject to discrimination.
The opening provisions of the act identify as a form of discrimination
the keeping of people in institutions and the failure to make modifications
to existing programs and practices to end isolation from the community.19
The specific ADA section that serves as the basis for the Olmstead case is
Title II, which sets forth requirements for public entities, including state
government and health care services that are funded and administered
by state agencies.20 Title II prohibits people with disabilities from being
“excluded from participation in or...denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or...subjected to discrimination
by any such entity.”21 These prohibitions in the ADA provided the legal
basis for people with disabilities to sue states.
Under the authority of the ADA, the Department of Justice promulgated
Title II regulations, two of which are important in the Court’s Olmstead
decision. The first, sometimes referred to as the “integration regulation,”
requires a state to administer services “in the most integrated setting
appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.”22
The most integrated setting is defined as “a setting that enables
individuals with disabilities to interact with non-disabled persons to
the fullest extent possible.”23
The second key regulation, sometimes referred to as the “reasonable-
modifications regulation,” says a state “shall make reasonable
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications
are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless
the [state] can demonstrate that making the modifications would
fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.”
Requiring significant new expenditures or immediately closing institutions
can be considered fundamental alterations in the nature of a program.
The combination of the two regulations results in a mandate that has
some caveats: a state must provide services to people with disabilities in
an integrated community setting unless it can prove that the act of
compliance would be so great that it constitutes a fundamental
alteration.24 While these two regulations had been in place for years, the
Disabilities Covered by
the ADA
To allow for the future inclusion
of currently unrecognized
conditions, the statutory lan-
guage is nonspecific. The
regulations nonetheless provide
many illustrative examples
when defining impairments and
limits of major life activities that
can result in disability.
■ A “physical or mental impair-
ment” includes any physiologi-
cal condition, cosmetic disfigure-
ment, or anatomical loss affect-
ing one or more of the body
systems. It includes any mental
or psychological disorder such
as mental retardation, organic
brain syndrome, emotional or
mental illnesses, and learning
disabilities.
■ In defining “substantially
limits one or more major life
activity,” the regulations include
activities such as caring for
oneself, performing manual
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Supreme Court had not handed down a Title II ruling on them until it
agreed to hear the Olmstead case, which involved two people seeking
community-based placement.
THE FACTS OF THE CASE
Despite the complexity of the Olmstead decision, the specifics of the case
are straightforward. Two residents of Georgia Regional Hospital in
Atlanta (GRHA), a state psychiatric hospital, sought placements in the
community.25 One had a diagnosis of a developmental disability (DD)
and the other of mental retardation (MR). Both had co-occurring mental
illnesses and histories of treatment in institutional settings. When their
conditions had stabilized, they sought placement in a community setting.
The GRHA treatment professionals agreed that the needs of these residents
could be met in a community-based program. And Georgia had slots
available under a Medicaid home- and community-based services waiver
for people with MR/DD. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs remained
institutionalized well after their request for community placement.
They filed a suit against the Georgia Department of Human Resources,
then led by Commissioner Tommy Olmstead. The suit alleged that the
state’s failure to discharge them to a community-care residential program
was a form of discrimination prohibited by the ADA.
The first court to hear the case, a district court, ruled that the state
violated the ADA by segregating the plaintiffs in an institution rather
than placing them in an integrated setting under the state’s community-
based services program. The 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed
that the plaintiffs were protected by the ADA and had been victims of
discrimination. The state appealed the rulings and the U.S. Supreme
Court agreed to hear the case.
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
ADA-Prohibited Discrimination
The Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts’ judgements that the
plaintiffs were protected by the ADA and had been subjected to state
discrimination by being kept in an institutional setting. The decision
that the plaintiffs were victims of discrimination is significant in and of
itself, for it rejected the method commonly used by the Supreme Court
in determining discrimination.
In the past, courts have often determined whether there is discrimination
by comparing two classes to see if one group (or class) of people received
preference over the other (for example, black persons and white persons,
males and females, or aged and nonaged). This common method of
determining discrimination set an impossibly high standard for the
disabled because it would require evidence that the nondisabled persons
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were receiving services that the disabled did not receive. Since the
nondisabled did not need the types of services the disabled needed, it
was very difficult to demonstrate discrimination.
The majority opinion recognized that discrimination could also occur
within a class, such as people with disabilities (that is, the denial of
services to one group of people with disabilities but not to another).26
This new method enables a person with disabilities not in a waiver
program to prove discrimination when similarly disabled persons are
receiving community-based services under a Medicaid waiver.
Rights of People with Disabilities to Community Services:
The Qualified Yes
The Court then ruled that the ADA regulation mandating that services
be administered in the most integrated setting can be used by people
with disabilities to demand placement in a community setting. People
with disabilities were handed a new tool that greatly enhanced their
ability to obtain services in a home setting.
At the same time, however, the Court noted that the requirement to
provide community services is not absolute. The Court ruled that, before
requiring a state to transfer people with disabilities to a community
setting, three conditions must be met: (a) “the State’s treatment
professionals have determined that community placement is appropriate,”
(b) “the transfer from institutional care to a less restrictive setting is not
opposed by the affected individual,” and (c) “the placement can be
reasonably accommodated [by the state], taking into account the
resources available to the State and the needs of others with mental
disabilities.”27
The first two conditions of the judgement protect the patient. The Court
wanted to avoid creating an incentive for states simply to empty their
hospitals to save money. In a concurring opinion, Justices Anthony
Kennedy and Stephen Breyer noted that past attempts at
deinstituionalizing the mentally ill had a “dark side,” in which a massive
depopulation of mental hospitals overwhelmed the limited capacity of
community providers, often leading to little or no treatment and a life
of homelessness.28 And the majority opinion noted that patients cannot
be transferred without their approval, because there are not “any federal
requirements that community-based treatment be imposed on patients
who do not desire it.”29
The third condition of the judgement, “placement can be reasonably
accommodated,” provides some protection for the state. The Court
opinion notes that the state’s obligation to provide services in an
integrated (that is, community) setting to people with disabilities is “not
boundless.” Although a significant portion of the majority opinion
focused on this issue, determining the reasonableness of a proposed
state action or inaction has proved to be one of the most problematic
The requirement to
provide community
services is not abso-
lute.
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aspects of the Court’s guidance. Despite the Court’s best efforts,
reasonable accommodation has been a source of contention in the
subsequent federal court lawsuits between advocates and states.
The Grey Area between “Reasonable Modification” and
“Fundamental Alteration”
In crafting the third condition for requiring community placement, the
Court noted that the ADA Title II reasonable-modifications regulation
allows a state to discriminate if the proposed modification would
fundamentally alter the nature of the program. The next step for the
Court was to provide guidance in determining the point at which a
proposed modification (for example, a community placement) becomes
so extensive or expensive that it constitutes a fundamental alteration in
the program and, therefore, relieves the state of the requirement to
provide such services.30
Determining the appropriate method for considering these costs and
the point at which the costs of compliance become too great was the
most nettlesome issue for the three courts that ruled on the Olmstead
case. Each had a different interpretation.
The District Court ruling originally decided that, since the average cost of
providing services to the two plaintiffs in a community setting would be
less than the average cost of providing services in an institutional setting,
the modification was reasonable.31 The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals found
that definition of costs too narrow. It said that when looking at the costs
of a remedy, the courts should consider “whether the additional
expenditures [for home- and community-based services]. . .would be
unreasonable given the demands of the State’s mental health budget.”32
The Supreme Court found both of the lower courts’ consideration of costs
to be “unacceptable.” By limiting the consideration of expense to placing
one or two people into a community setting “against the State’s entire
mental health budget, it is unlikely that a State...could ever prevail.” The
majority opinion argued that the courts must also consider “the range of
services the State provides others with mental disabilities, and the State’s
obligation to mete out those services equitably.”33 Hence, the Supreme Court
included the third prong of its judgement: “taking into account the resources
available to the State and the needs of others with mental disabilities.”
The Court’s Example
The three-pronged judgement, as powerful as it is, is still rather vague
and subject to differing interpretations in determining the acceptable
cost of compliance. The Court seems to have implicitly acknowledged
that developing a single methodology capable of balancing the rights of
the disabled and public-sector costs in all states and in all circumstances
was futile. In the absence of a methodology, Ginsburg wrote, there were
The ADA reasonable-
modifications regula-
tion allows a state to
discriminate if the pro-
posed modification
would fundamentally
alter the nature of the
program.
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alternative ways for a state to demonstrate compliance. She even
provided an example, writing that, “if, for example, the State were to
demonstrate that it had a comprehensive, effectively working plan for
placing qualified persons with mental disabilities in less restrictive
settings” and “a waiting list that moved at a reasonable pace not
controlled by the State’s endeavors to keep its institutions fully populated,
the reasonable modifications standard would be met.”34
This example has become synonomous with the Olmstead judgement,35
serves as the critical pillar in the subsequent CMS guidance, and was
instrumental in launching dozens of state task forces and workgroups
charged with developing “a comprehensive, effectively working plan.”
As noted later, the example may also be an important factor in ensuring
that, in the long run, states continually enhance the supply of community-
based long-term services.
The Olmstead ruling is truly a landmark decision. The ruling that
discrimination can occur within a class makes it easier to sue states
successfully for providing Medicaid waiver services to some people
with disabilities but not others. The decision reinforces the ADA goal
of integrating people with disabilities into the community. And it puts
states on notice that they will have to justify to the courts a decision to
deny a person with a disability from receiving care in a community
setting. It is not surprising that the response to the ruling was broad-
based and immediate.
EXECUTIVE BRANCH REACTION
The Olmstead ruling elicited a powerful response from federal
policymakers in the executive branch. Across two administrations, it
has served as the catalyst for a sustained state grant program, an
innovative approach to providing state technical assistance, and a
broadening of federal agency involvement.
The Clinton Administration: Swift Response
Guidance — The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
alerted states about the significance of the Olmstead case immediately after
the decision was handed down. Six months later, CMS issued guidance
suggesting activities that states should be doing to comply with the ADA.36
In the guidance, a set of six principles was issued (see text box), with each
principle including several suggested best practices that states should
consider adopting in their plans.
Although the guidance is not legally enforceable as a regulation (only
the Department of Justice can issue ADA regulations), CMS stated that a
state’s conformance with these principles and practices would be
considered by the DHHS Office for Civil Rights when it investigates
ADA complaints and conducts ADA compliance reviews.
DHHS Principles for State
Compliance with the ADA
■ Develop and implement a
comprehensive, effectively
working plan.
■ Provide an opportunity for the
public, including people with
disabilities, to be integral
participants in the plan.
■ Take steps to prevent or correct
unjustified institutionalization.
■ Ensure the availability of
community-integrated services.
■ Afford people with disabilities
the opportunity to make in-
formed choices.
■ Take steps to ensure quality
assurance in the delivery of
community-based services.
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The department also issued revised Medicaid rules to enable more low-
income people with disabilities and families with disabled children to
obtain Medicaid coverage while living at home.37 The rule allows a state,
under its medically needy program, to disregard portions of a person’s
income used to pay for food, clothing, or housing. This change helps
reduce the institutional bias that lets people living in institutions qualify
for Medicaid at higher income levels than if they lived in the community.
New Grants and Technical Assistance — The Clinton administration
and Congress also authorized $64 million for three grant programs, under
an initiative called Systems Change Grants for Community Living. These
grants are to assist states in developing and implementing plans to meet
Olmstead guidance.38 The largest program, Real Choice Systems Change,
provides states with grant funds to make infrastructure improvements in
personal assistance services, quality assurance, consumer-directed care,
comprehensive long-term care system reforms, and other similar efforts
to assist people with disabilities in receiving quality home-care services.
A second program, Nursing Facility Transition, provides grants to either
state agencies or community organizations. The grants support activities
to assist in the transition of individuals who are in an institution (or are
at risk of requiring a nursing home placement) to a community-integrated
living arrangement. The third grants program, Community Integrated
Personal Assistance Services and Support, assists in efforts to increase
the use of consumer-directed personal care and the availability of
personal care workers.
Supplementing the systems change grants is a national technical assistance
and evaluation exchange collaborative to help states in implementing
their grants and Olmstead plans. The collaborative exchange includes
two national organizations (Rutgers Center for State Health Policy and
Independent Living Research Utilization) that have conducted research
and evaluations in the field of home and community care. This exchange
includes other organizations and consultants to assist the grantees.39 As
a result of the systems change grants, states have additional resources
to commit staff to the issue, interact with their counterparts in other
states, and have access to a national network of experts.
The Bush Administration: Renewed Energy
The availability of the systems change grants was announced less than
two weeks before the change of administrations in January 2001. Given
the transition, there was a risk that the momentum built by the Court
ruling, CMS guidance, and the unveiling of the new grant program could
dissipate while the new administration devoted its energy to assuming
the reins of power and filling its agency positions. That did not happen.
On February 1, 2001, President Bush announced the New Freedom
Initiative, a multi-agency effort to improve access to community living
and the economic status of persons with disabilities.40 Affirming his strong
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support of the ADA, the president said that the swift implementation of
the Olmstead ruling was a priority of the administration.
On February 25, 2001, the new DHHS secretary, Tommy Thompson,
announced before the nation’s governors the availability of a $50,000
“starter grant” to promote state plan development of the systems change
grant program. This effort, with a streamlined application process, was
designed to engage as many states as possible in developing
comprehensive efforts to comply with Olmstead. All 48 states that
requested a starter, or planning, grant received one.41 In September 2001,
CMS announced that 31 states and one territory were subsequently
awarded one or more grants under the Systems Change Grants for
Community Living program.
On June 18, 2001, Bush followed up his February announcement of the
New Freedom Initiative with an executive order, Community-Based
Alternatives for Individuals with Disabilities.42 The order directed several
federal agencies with responsibilities for serving people with disabilities
to work cooperatively in ensuring that the Olmstead decision is
implemented in a timely manner.43 Each department was instructed to
work with states in complying with the ADA and to evaluate its policies,
programs, statutes and regulations to identify any that needed revision
to improve the availability of community-based services. DHHS was
charged with coordinating this effort.
On March 25, 2002, Thompson announced that $55 million in new
funding was available under the Systems Change Grants for Community
Living program.44 By September 2002, 48 states, the District of Columbia,
and two territories had received at least one grant under the systems
change grants program. The technical assistance collaborative also
received supplemental funding. In February 2003, Congress approved
the DHHS request for an additional $40 million to fund more systems
change grants. An identical amount to fund more grants has been
proposed in the fiscal year 2004 budget.
Also on March 25, 2002, DHHS released a 437-page New Freedom
Initiative report, “Delivering on the Promise.”45 The report includes
hundreds of recommended actions for federal agencies in removing policy
and regulatory barriers that impede people with disabilities from living
in the community and thriving economically. During the summer of 2002
the president appointed the New Freedom Commission on Mental Health.
In September of 2002, a new Office of Disability was created within the
DHHS Office of the Secretary and assigned the responsibility for
departmental coordination of Olmstead compliance. Additional federal
activities on this front include the awarding of grants by DHHS’ Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, the Department of
Labor and, the Department of Education to assist with Olmstead
implementation.46
By September 2002,
48 states, the District
of Columbia, and two
territories had re-
ceived at least one
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STATES’ RESPONSES
State reaction to the Olmstead ruling was also swift and broad in scope. By
the end of 2000, 37 states had task forces or work groups to develop
comprehensive plans or significant papers that could serve as blueprints
of change.47 The size and representativeness of these work groups was
extensive. The few states that did not initiate specific Olmstead planning
activities argued they were already implementing efforts to improve the
availability of community-based services. For example, Vermont has no
institution for people with developmental disabilities, and all nursing home
residents have been assessed for community-based services. Oregon has
a six-year plan to eliminate a waiting list of 5,000 individuals desiring
services under a home- and community-based waiver.48 Nonetheless, these
two states were among the 48 that received systems change grants.
A review of the state plans and papers issued either in final or draft
form found several common, long-standing barriers to complying with
the Olmstead ruling—barriers that are difficult and often expensive to
surmount (see text box). Compounding these obstacles is the current
state fiscal crisis. Recent shortfalls have constrained the growth in
resources available for financing expansions in Medicaid services,
including home- and community-based services, and have likely diverted
the attention of Medicaid long-term care staff toward the immediate
need to contain Medicaid costs. In light of such difficult barriers and a
tight fiscal environment, implementation of Olmstead might be expected
to grind to a halt in virtually all states.
In fact, while states’ progress in complying with the Olmstead decision
may have slowed somewhat compared to the initial burst of activity,
planning and design activity continues. One reason for this continued
activity has been the systems change grants. The combination of grant
funds and the existence of a technical collaborative has enabled fiscally
stressed states to maintain some staff time devoted to Olmstead and
have the access to a national network of expert assistance necessary to
design and implement.49
Another force behind continued state activity has been the pressure
created by the legal challenges filed by people with disabilities. These
cases constitute the next stage in Olmstead implementation. They will be
instrumental in deciding how many people will be protected by the
ADA and in which settings (for example, only institutional or also the
community). They will also determine how quickly people with
disabilities will receive home-care services.
IMPLEMENTATION: DISTRICT COURT RULINGS
Care must be taken when examining the many Olmstead-related court
cases, for very few have completed the trial phase, much less been
subjected to review by the appellate courts. While it is tempting to select
State-Identified Needs
■ Affordable and accessible
housing.
■ Transportation (nonmedical).
■ Assessment tools to identify
people’s needs.
■ Information tools to link
people with services.
■ Data systems to monitor
quality and track people at risk.
■ Adequate staffing.
■ Education and outreach.
■ Availability of funded Medic-
aid waivers.
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cases that may serve as precedents, such an effort is fraught with peril.50
Each case has unique circumstances that may mitigate its likelihood of
serving as a precedent. Successfully picking the “right one” is unlikely.
This predicament is exacerbated by the relative dearth of precise guidance
from the regulations issued under Title II of the ADA and the absence of
case law regarding fundamental alteration within the context of
community-based care.51 It will take years for the key issues to wend
their way through the courts before case law is built and precedents
handed down.
Nonetheless, looking at the Olmstead decision and a few key rulings by
the district courts does reveal some of the emerging policy issues courts
will struggle with in the coming years:
■ Will the courts interpret broadly who is covered by the Olmstead
ruling?
■ Will courts require home placements when waiver slots are avail-
able, as in the original Olmstead case?
■ After existing waiver slots are filled, will the courts require states
to expand their waiver programs, resulting in sustained long-term
expansion of home care services?
The courts’ rulings on the range of individuals covered by Olmstead will
have a major impact on both people with disabilities and state and federal
budgets. Since the Olmstead plaintiffs had developmental disabilities and
were residing in a state psychiatric hospital, the Supreme Court’s majority
opinion considered its decision within the context of mental disabilities,
state mental health budgets, and state psychiatric institutions. The ADA,
however, covers people with all types of disabilities—physical as well
as mental; it also covers people living in other types of institutions, such
as nursing homes, and those living in the community.
Estimates of the Number of People Affected by Olmstead
Currently, there is no reliable estimate for the number of people who
may benefit from the ruling. There are approximately 34 million people
with severe disabilities and 10.4 million people with disabilities so severe
that they need some level of personal assistance.52 The General
Accounting Office (GAO), which has a more conservative approach to
the disability numbers, estimates that there are 2.3 million adults with
severe disabilities living in the community who need considerable
assistance from another person.53 And, it estimates, there are
approximately 1.8 million people with disabilities that are living in
institutions (that is, nursing facilities, institutions for the mentally
retarded and developmentally disabled, and state or county facilities
for the mentally ill).
The GAO did not relate these figures to the number of people to whom
Olmstead may apply. It concluded that there was too much uncertainty
There is no reliable esti-
mate for the number of
people who  may ben-
efit from the ruling.
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about the widely varying population of people with disabilities, the
settings in which they are receviving services, and their true risk of
institutionalization to make such an estimate. Thus, one must look
elsewhere to provide some illumination of who may potentially benefit
from the ruling.
The conditions of people with disabilities seeking remedies in the courts
are similar to those of the Olmstead plaintiffs. The most extensive and
frequently updated listing of Olmstead-related lawsuits is by Human
Services Research Institute (HSRI). In 10 states, the plaintiffs have a
developmental disability or are mentally retarded, are residing in
institutions, and are seeking community placements.54 If this trend is to
continue, the reach of Olmstead will still be important but limited in scope.
However, there is the potential for greater pressure in broadening the
scope of Olmstead. Four other cases have at least some plaintiffs who
have physical disabilities. The most recent is a Georgia case filed on
January 31, 2003; in Birdsong et al. v. Perdue, a class action complaint has
been filed on behalf of individuals with physical disabilities who reside
in nursing homes or are at risk of nursing home placement.55 The suit
alleges that Georgia has made no significant effort to expand home- and
community-based services since the Olmstead decision.
Another study by the Center for Health Services Research and Policy at
the George Washington University supports the argument that pressure
is building for a broader scope of Olmstead. The study examined the
characteristics of people who have filed a Title II ADA-related complaint
with the DHHS Office of Civil Rights (OCR) and found that many
differed from those of the plaintiffs in Olmstead and Olmstead-related
lawsuits.56 For example, 50 percent of those who filed an OCR complaint
were people with physical disabilities.57 In terms of living arrangements,
42 percent were in nursing homes, and 30 percent were residing in the
community (most of them living with families).58
One substantial subgroup of people with disabilities does not constitute
a significant proportion in either study—people with disabilities who
are age 65 and older. This is surprising because aging advocates played
an active role in many of the state Olmstead workgroups. However, no
conclusions can be drawn from the HSRI and OCR studies since their
methodologies may underestimate the true involvement of the aged in
Olmstead-related efforts.59 If the aged disabled increase their participation
in future legal cases, Olmstead could have a larger impact.
The Short Term: Placement in Home- and Community-Based
Services Waivers Programs
A second critical issue courts will grapple with is whether to require
the states to place people in existing home- and community-based
services waiver programs. In the Olmstead case, Georgia had vacant
slots under a waiver program that fit the needs of the plaintiffs. The
15
NHPF Background Paper March 12, 2003
waiver slots were vacant because the state had not allocated state
funding. A question the district courts are facing, but few have decided,
is whether fulfilling a request for a placement is a reasonable
modification when slots are available.
In post-Olmstead settlement agreements, many states are filling vacant
slots and expanding their home- and community-based services waiver
programs to include more slots. Over a five-year period, Massachusetts
will extend community services to an additional 375 to 400 people per
year.60 Hawaii has agreed to increase the number of waiver slots by 70
percent over a three-year period. Louisiana, Washington, and West Virginia
have also signed agreements to expand the number of waiver slots.
Not all states, however, are filling vacant slots. In response to the state
fiscal crisis, Michigan and Idaho proposed reducing the number of filled
waiver slots. Michigan’s proposal is being challenged in court. In one
district case, Benjamin v. Ohl, the federal district court instructed the
state that it “will have to show more than that the state has not
appropriated enough funding.”61
The Long Run: Expansion Potential for
Community-Based Services
A third critical question that courts will need to address in determining
whether states’ efforts meet the reasonable-modifications standard
involves what to do when a state’s waiver slots are filled: Will courts
require states to obtain new waivers or will they be allowed to have their
waiting lists grow? One interpretation is that instructing the state to expand
its waiver program would constitute a “fundamental alteration,” since it
might require the state to reallocate budget funds from a disability program
to finance a waiver expansion.62 This could violate Ginsburg’s admonition
that states “mete out services with an even hand.”
It is not clear how the courts will rule on this issue. As noted, in response
to Olmstead-related lawsuits, several states have signed settlement
agreements expanding the number of waiver slots. But those settlements
were signed between February 2000 and August 2001, when state budgets
were in good shape.63 No similarly broad agreements have been crafted
since then.
One case, Arc of Washington State v. Lyle Quasima, did touch on this issue.
The federal district judge made a summary ruling dismissing the case.
The dismissal was based on the finding that the ADA cannot serve as the
basis for ordering a state to increase its limit on the number of individuals
who receive waiver services. Doing so would require the state to make a
“fundamental alteration” in its services.64 This case, however, eventually
resulted in a settlement agreement signed in April 2001.
If other courts hand down decisions that adopt the argument of the judge
in Arc of Washington v. Lyle Quasima, a deterrent for expanding the supply
Between February 2000
and August 2001, when




panding the number of
waiver slots.
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of home- and community-based services could be created. States, knowing
that obtaining more waiver slots will place them under great legal pressure
to fill them immediately, may decide not to request additional slots.
If this disincentive were to occur, Olmstead could slow the expansion of
new waiver slots—the exact opposite of what advocates are seeking.
The overall effect of Olmstead could simply be a short-term spurt in
funding unfilled home- and community-based service waiver slots,
followed by slow growth thereafter. However, adopting the scenario in
Ginsburg’s two-part example—an effective plan and a waiting list moving
at a reasonable pace—could lead to a quite different conclusion.
For a state to demonstrate it has met the first criterion in the example—
a “comprehensive, effectively working plan for placing qualified persons
with mental disabilities in less restrictive settings”—implies that it must
be making continued progress in improving the availability of community
placements. The district courts will have to rule on what constitutes
such a plan. Although there is no systematic report on the implementation
status of state plans, one study of plans in 14 states found that their
implementation would put those states in compliance with the Olmstead
decision.65 In only one case (Arc of Delaware v. Meconi), which has yet to
go to trial, has the plaintiff argued that the state’s plan is inadequate.66
Determining whether a state is conforming to the second part of the
Court’s example—”a waiting list that moved at a reasonable pace”—is
more problematic: A state may have a difficult time arguing it is
complying with Title II of the ADA if the waiting list for waiver slots
remains static or moves very slowly. While no decisions based on the
ADA have focused exclusively on what constitutes a reasonable pace, a
set of court cases focused on Medicaid waiting lists could provide
precedents for defining it.67
Under Medicaid law, services are to be provided with “reasonable
promptness.” In a watershed decision, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled federal Medicaid law does not allow a state to wait-list individuals
for ICF/MR (intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded) waiver
services indefinitely.68 While reasonable promptness has not been
precisely defined, there appears to be a growing consensus among some
courts that frequent waiting periods of “many years are outside of the
zone of reasonableness.”69 Thus, in the longer term, the Ginsburg example
may provide people with disabilities additional support in challenging
states that hope to be in compliance simply by filling vacant waiver slots
without ever expanding their waiver programs.
AN EVOLVING POLICY DRAMA
At this point, Olmstead has raised many more issues than it has answered.
That should not be surprising, since, despite being handed down almost
four years ago, Olmstead is still in the preliminary stages of
implementation.
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And following the progress of Olmstead will be frustrating. Unlike other
major policy actions, such as new federal legislation, there are no clearly
stated objectives, budgets, or timetables to guide and measure
implementation. The pace of implementation will fluctuate, undergoing
both periods of intense activity, such as the year following the Supreme
Court decision, and phases, like the present, of slower progress. The
timing of subsequent court decisions will be unpredictable and sporadic,
resulting in piecemeal clarification.
Future periods of increased activity will likely result from key court
decisions, especially at the appellate and, possibly, at the Supreme Court
levels.70 Numerous court decisions will have to be made before sufficient
case law is built clarifying who is covered under Olmstead, where the
boundary lays between a reasonable accommodation and a fundamental
alteration, when a waiting list is moving at a reasonable pace, and what
constitutes an effectively working state plan. Given the glacial pace of
the legal process, therefore, it will be years before the full impact of
Olmstead is known.
Care must be taken in estimating the power of Olmstead to effect change.
Regardless of future court decisions, there are still many issues impeding
the expansion of home- and community-based long-term services that
are not addressed by Olmstead. It does not increase the workforce needed
to deliver more services, nor does it create an oversight system assuring
that the community-based services delivered are of high quality. A number
of questions are yet to be answered if home- and community-based care
are to be expanded:
■ How can the true extent of the “woodwork effect” on the demand
for services in the community setting be determined?
■ Will the federal government provide states additional assistance in
meeting their obligations?
■ Will the New Freedom Initiative, including the systems change
grants, be able to meet the high expectations for removing barriers to
community care at the federal and state levels?
■ Are there other state financing strategies that can be developed to
fund an increase in services?
Although Olmstead is not the solution to bridging the large gap between
demand and supply for home- and community-based services, it does
apply additional pressure on state and federal policymakers to address
these issues. And it adds another stakeholder in the process—judges
who will be determining whether the pace of implementation is adequate.
How powerful this force will be is yet to be determined. Nonetheless,
the ruling has served as a catalyst for state and federal government
activity. It has empowered people with disabilities, particularly those
residing in institutions, with legal recourse to obtain home- and
community-based services. And the Court’s opinion has set into motion
Given the glacial pace
of the legal process,  it
will be years before the
full impact of Olmstead
is known.
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a new expectation for community-based services that will be hard to
ignore. Long-term care policymakers will find it difficult not to make
some accommodation to this ruling today and in the years to come.
ENDNOTES
1. Jefferson D. E. Smith and Steve P. Calandrillo, “Forward to Fundamental Alteration:
Addressing ADA Title II Integration Lawsuits after Olmstead v. L.C.,” Harvard Journal of Law
and Public Policy, Summer 2001.
2. Sara Rosenbaum, “Olmstead v. L.C.: Analysis and Implications for Medicaid Policy,”
working paper, Center for Health Care Strategies, Lawrenceville, New Jersey, May 2000;
accessed February 10, 2003, at http://www.chcs.org/publications/pdf/cas/Olmstead.pdf.
3. Kathryn G. Allen, “Long-Term Care: Implications of Supreme Court’s Olmstead Deci-
sion Are Still Unfolding” (GAO-01-1167T), testimony before the Special Committee on Ag-
ing, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C., September 24, 2001; accessed March 6, 2003, at http://
www.ohiosilc.org/il/library/medicaid/d011167t.pdf.
4. Barbara Polister, ed., “Policies and Resources Related to Waiting Lists of Persons with
Mental Retardation and Related Developmental Disabilities,” University of Minnesota, Min-
neapolis, June 2002; accessed February 11, 2003 at http://rtc.umn.edu/pdf/waitlist2002.pdf.
5. Gary Smith, Janet O’Keeffe, Letty Carpenter, Pamela Doty, Gavin Kennedy, Brian Burwell,
Robert Mollica, and Loretta Williams, “Understanding Medicaid Home and Community
Services: A Primer,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Washington, D.C.,
October 2000; accessed February 7, 2003, at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/primer.htm.
6. The “woodwork effect” theory is based on the belief that if the states and the federal
government were to pay for substantially expanded home-based and community-based
care, the many people who currently remain at home or in the community because of the
supportive care being provided by family or friends would come forward to claim the
expanded benefits. Thus, the savings realized by providing less-expensive, home- and com-
munity-based care for persons formerly residing in an institutional setting would be more
than offset by the increased number of people who would take advantage of the benefits.
7. For example, in 1980 payments for nursing home care comprised 34 percent of total
Medicaid payments, while home health services comprised 1.4 percent. See Congressional
Research Service (CRS), Medicaid Source Book: Background Data and Analysis (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1993), Table II-13.
8. Robert Wardwell, Visiting Nurses Associations of America, telephone communication
with author, December 3, 2002. Also, a description of those and similar evaluations is
available in Pamela Doty, “Cost-Effectiveness of Home and Community-Based Long-Term
Care Services,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, June 2000; accessed Febru-
ary 11, 2003, at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/costeff.htm..
9. Wardwell, telephone communication.
10. Wardwell, telephone communication. An example of the restraint in growth is revealed
by a comparison of Medicaid payments. Home health services grew from 1.4 percent of total
Medicaid payments in 1980, to 5 percent in 1990. Nursing home payments in 1990 were 27
percent. See CRS, Medicaid Source Book.
11. Allen, “Long-Term Care.”
12. Allen, “Long-Term Care.” The 50th state, Arizona, has a Section 1115 waiver that in-
cludes home- and community-based services offered under Section 1915(c).
13. Gary Smith, “Status Report: Litigation Concerning Medicaid Services for Persons with
Developmental and Other Disabilities,” Human Services Research Institute, Portland, Or-
egon; accessed February 11, 2002, at http://www.hsri.org/index.asp?id=news. The waiting
19
NHPF Background Paper March 12, 2003
list numbers are from court records. Current information on waiting lists is difficult of obtain,
for state reports on waiting lists are sporadic and often incomplete. Also, the presence of a list
can be misleading at times. For example, a person may be receiving a variety of home health
services but be on a waiting list for a narrow, unmet need, such as a housing modification.
14. Sara Rosenbaum, Alexandra Stewart, and Joel Teitelbaum, “Defining ‘Reasonable Pace’
In the Post-Olmstead Environment,” working paper, Center for Health Care Strategies,
Lawrenceville, New Jersey, April 2002; accessed September 22, 2002, at http://www.chcs.org/
publications/pdf/cas/reasonablepace.pdf.
15. Andrew I. Batavia, “A Right to Personal Assistance Services: ‘Most Integrated Setting
Appropriate’ Requirements and the Independent Living Model of Long-Term Care,” Ameri-
can Journal of Law and Medicine, 28, no.2 (Spring 2001).
16. President, “New Freedom Initiative,” White House, February 1, 2001; accessed April 10,
2002, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/freedominitiative/freedominitiative.html.
17. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Section 3, Definitions; accessed February 11,
2003, at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/pubs/ada.txt.
18. This information was drawn from the ADA Title II regulations, Section 35.104, Defini-
tions; accessed March 6, 2003, at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/reg2.html. The regula-
tions also list over 18 specific conditions, including diabetes, epilepsy, cancer, hearing impair-
ment, drug addiction and alcoholism.
19. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999); accessed February 11, 2003, at http://caselaw.lp.
findlaw.com/cgibin/getcase.pl?court=US&navby=case&vol=000&invol=98536.
20. Rosenbaum, “Olmstead: Analysis“ Two other Titles of ADA proscribe discriminatory
practices in employment (Title I) and public accommodations (Title III). Title I, while not
addressed in the Olmstead ruling or in this paper, is nonetheless of interest to health
policymakers, for it applies to employment-related benefits, such as health coverage.
21. Olmstead v. L.C. In the same section the opinion also notes that the statute defines a public
entity as “any state or local government,” and “any department, agency, [or] special purpose
district” of a state or local government. A qualified individual is “an individual with a
disability who with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the
removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of aux-
iliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services
or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.”
22. Olmstead v. L.C.
23. Olmstead v. L.C.
24. Olmstead v. L.C. The “reasonable-modifications rule” is sometimes referred to in post-
Olmstead articles as the “fundamental alteration rule.”
25. L.C. v. Olmstead, U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, No. 97-8538; accessed March 20,
2002, at http://laws.lp.findlaw.com/11th/978538OPN.html. See also Olmstead v. L.C.
26. This alternative method of determining discrimination generated a stinging dissent from
Justice Clarence Thomas that was joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice
Antonin Scalia. They argued that “discrimination, as typically understood, requires a show-
ing that a claimant received differential treatment vis-a-vis members of a different group on
the basis of a statutorily described characteristic.”
27. Olmstead v. L.C.
28. The facts of the case raised this concern. One of the plaintiffs received a recommendation
for a community placement, a homeless shelter. This was quickly rescinded by the state.
29. Olmstead v. L.C.
30. Justices Kennedy and Breyer noted in a concurring opinion that the courts must show
“appropriate deference to the program funding decisions of state policymakers.”
31. Olmstead v. L.C.
20
NHPF Background Paper March 12, 2003
32. Olmstead v. L.C.
33. Olmstead v. L.C.
34. Olmstead v. L.C.
35. The example’s impact is striking, given that it comes from a section of the opinion where
there is a plurality of four justices, not a majority.
36. Donna E. Shalala, “Secretary’s Letter to Governors on Olmstead Decision,” U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, Washington, D.C., January 14, 2000; accessed February
22, 2003, at http://cms.hhs.gov/states/letters/smd1140b.asp.
37. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “HHS Proposes Changes Allowing
States to Expand Medicaid Coverage,” press release, October 27, 2000; accessed February
22, 2003, at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2000pres/20001027.html.
38. Timothy M. Westmoreland, “Olmstead Update No. 5 (New Tools for States),” letter to
Medicaid directors, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, January 10, 2001;
accessed February 23, 2003, at http://cms.hhs.gov/states/letters/smd110a1.pdf.
39. For more information about the systems change grantees and the Community Living
Exchange Collaborative, see Resource Network on Home and Community-Based Services,
“Community Living Exchange Collaborative: A National Technical Assistance Program,” at
http://www.hcbs.org/exchange_collaborative.htm.
40. President, “New Freedom Initiative.”
41 Only Arizona and South Dakota did not apply.
42. President, Executive Order, “Community-Based Alternatives for Individuals with Dis-
abilities,” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, June 19, 2001; accessed February 28,
2002, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010619.html.
43. The agencies included the Departments of Health and Human Services, Justice, Educa-
tion, Labor, and Housing and Urban Development as well as the Social Security Administra-
tion. Subsequently, this effort was joined by the Departments of Transportation and Veterans
Affairs, along with the U.S. Office of Personnel Management.
44. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Delivering on the Promise—Report of
Federal Agencies’ Actions to Eliminate Barriers and Promote Community Integration,” press
release, Washington, D.C., March 25, 2000; accessed June 14, 2002, at http://www.hhs.gov/
news/press/2002pres/20020325.html
45. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Delivering on the Promise: Self-Evalu-
ation to Promote Community Living for People with Disabilities,” report to the president on
Executive Order 13217, March 2002; accessed February 11, 2003, at http://www.hhs.gov/
newfreedom/final/hhsfull.html.
46. Donna Folkemer, National Conference of State Legislatures, telephone communication
with author, February 5, 2003.
47. Wendy Fox-Grage, Donna Folkemer, and Kevein Horahan, “The States’ Response to the
Olmstead Decision: A Status Report,” National Conference of State Legislatures, March 2001;
accessed January 19, 2003, at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/forum/
olmsreport2001.pdf.
48. Fox-Grage, Folkemer, and Horahan, “States’ Response.”
49. Susan Reinhard, Rutgers Center for State Health Policy, email communication with au-
thor, February 11, 2003.
50. In contrast to the executive branch, where regulations and technical assistance are often
provided in implementing a new policy or program, the judicial branch does not have a
history of legal scholarship explicitly intended to inform advocates and judges of how to deal
with future cases. See Smith and Calandrillo, “Forward to Fundamental Alteration.”
51. This is in contrast to the more detailed guidelines issued under the employment and
public accommodation titles of the ADA. See Smith and Calandrillo, “Forward to Funda-
mental Alteration.”
21
NHPF Background Paper March 12, 2003
52. Author’s estimates made by extrapolating from the most recent data from the 1997 Survey
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data to the 2000 Census Bureau estimate of the
nation’s noninstitutionalized population (273,643,273 people). The SIPP estimates for the
percentage of people with varying levels of disability was derived from Jack McNeil, “Ameri-
cans With Disabilities 1997,” Current Population Reports, P70-73, U.S. Census Bureau, De-
partment of Commerce, February 2001; accessed March 6, 2003, at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2001pubs/p7073.pdf. The 2001 noninstitutionalized population estimate was de-
rived from Census Bureau, “Table 1: Total Population in Households and Group Quarters by
Sex and Selected Age Groups, for the United States: 2000”; accessed March 6, 2003, at  http:/
/www.census.gov/population/cen2000/grpqtr/grpqtr01.pdf.
53. Allen, “Long-Term Care.”
54. Smith, “Status Report.”
55. Smith, “Status Report.”
56. The DHHS OCR is responsible for investigating complaints of discrimination against
public entities receiving federal financial assistance for health or human services, such as a
state Medicaid agency. Recommendations for enforcement action are forwarded by the DHHS
OCR to the Department of Justice.
57. Sara Rosenbaum, Joel Teitelbaum, and Alexander Stewart. “An Analysis of Olmstead
Complaints: Implications for Policy and Long Term Planning,” Center for Health Care Strat-
egies, Lawrenceville, New Jersey, December 2001; accessed February 12, 2003, at http://
www.chcs.org/publications/pdf/cas/olmsteadcomplaints.pdf.
58. The author derived the figures from Rosenbaum, “Analysis of Olmstead Complaints.”
59. While continually updated, the Health Services Research Institute list on Medicaid litiga-
tion focuses on those cases being filed by people with developmental disabilities or mental
retardation. The study of complaints filed with the Office of Civil Rights by the Center for
Health Services Research and Policy was restricted to those complainants filed by the fall of
2001.
60. Smith, “Status Report.”
61. Rosenbaum, “‘Reasonable Pace.’”
62. Smith and Calandrillo, “Forward to Fundamental Alteration.”
63. Smith, “Status Report.”
64. Smith, “Status Report.”
65. Alexander Stewart, Joel Teitelbaum, and Sara Rosenbaum, “Implementing Community
Integration: A Review of State Olmstead Plans,” Center for Health Care Strategies,
Lawrenceville, New Jersey, October 2002; accessed December 12, 2002, at http://
www.chcs.org/publications/pdf/cas/stateOlmsteadplans.pdf.
66. Smith, “Status Report.”
67. Smith, “Status Report.” In fact, some of the cases are cited by some as violating the
ADA, however, many of the cases have been argued and won based on Medicaid statute and
not on ADA.
68. Smith, “Status Report.”
69. Rosenbaum, “‘Reasonable Pace.’”
70. Smith and Calandrillo, “Forward to Fundamental Alteration.” In the last decade, the
Supreme Court has expanded state government immunity from citizen lawsuits, citing
protection by the 11th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Every state fighting an Olmstead
lawsuit has cited protection under the 11th Amendment, although the district courts have
usually viewed the argument with skepticism. In early 2003, the Supreme Court accepted
another Title II ADA case, California Medical Board v. Hason, that may provide a ruling on this
issue. A decision will be announced in June of 2003.
